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(every genuinely real entity is at least minimally an experiencer) with the 
absolutism of F. H. Bradley (everything real is experienced by one abso­
lute being)—what he calls "Pantheistic Idealism." He believes it "serves 
the cause of religion in the best sense" (p. 473). For him, any metaphysics 
seeks "absolute truth about the nature of reality," and he wants this ab­
solute truth "made peculiarly perspicuous to him," which in turn means 
being able to "imagine" it (p. 476). Sprigge says he cannot imagine the 
unexperienced—it will always turn out to be part of a wider whole that is 
an experience. Thus concrete reality (as distinct from the abstractions of 
science) "consists of innumerable streams of experience interacting with 
each other," and all are included, eternally, "within a single absolute all­
embracing experience or consciousness" (pp. 483-486). This eternal "all­
embracing consciousness" Sprigge calls "God," though he admits there 
might be some dispute about the matter (p. 487). But he insists there is 
religious value in this view, whether or not it is orthodoxly Christian (he 
believes it does support "Jesus's two great commandments"); it has at 
least personal if not communal religious value, "[f]or it reassures us that 
somehow reality is not so fleeting or so bad as it often seems" (p. 529), 
though I am not clear how reassuring it is to be told that what is fleeting 
or bad is unreal.
No space remains for criticism, but only for a word of encouragement to 
potential readers. Those members of traditional theistic communities who 
believe in a personal God who is active in human history and who answers 
petitionary prayers may find Sprigge's "eternal consciousness" remote 
and inert. Those who consider time to be not illusory but the key to reality 
may find Sprigge's eternalism problematic, though they may warm to his 
panexperientialism. Those pursuing some au courant program of tough- 
minded naturalism will probably just ignore this book. All, however, could 
learn from this wise and learned philosopher. "The serious thinker will at­
tend to all arguments which have been put forward by figures of any intel­
lectual pretensions and accept or dismiss them independently of how far 
their conclusions fit the mood of any particular time" (p. 224). Sprigge is a 
serious thinker, no matter what the current mood, and he deserves wider 
attention than he is likely to get.
Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy o f Religion, 
by John Clayton, prepared for publication by Anne M. Blackburn and 
Thomas D. Carroll. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. vii 
+372 . $100 (hardback).
NANCY FRANKENBERRY, Dartmouth College
Cross-cultural philosophy of religion is honored more often by expecta­
tion than by execution. In this book we find both great expectations (for 
what John Clayton hoped to finish before his untimely death) and ratio­
nal execution (based largely on the text of Clayton's Stanton Lectures). 
Indeed, the very reasonableness of the essays and chapters assembled
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here and admirably prepared for publication by Anne M. Blackburn and 
Thomas D. Carroll may disguise the difficulty of executing Clayton's sin­
gle aim throughout these chapters: to historicize the operations of "ratio­
nality" by taking theistic proofs as test cases and studying their varied 
uses in pre-modern and modern contexts. Clayton's overall thesis—if so 
rich and multi-layered a work of scholarship can be boiled down—is that 
all instances of reasoning and argument occur within historically particu­
lar contexts and the failure to trace out these particularities leads to phil­
osophical distortions. While this may seem a commonplace assumption 
today, the investigation of its consequences and its application to topics in 
the philosophy of religion is not.
The introductory chapter, "Claims, Contexts and Contestability," high­
lights the notion of "group solidarity" and its enhancement as it func­
tioned in the pre-modern uses of theistic proofs within traditions, rather 
than between them. Something similar is visible in modern contexts, too, 
Clayton suggests. In "Thomas Jefferson and the Study of Religion," he 
pursues the theme of the parochial character of "natural religion," despite 
its pretension to provide a universal discourse, a limitation that he finds 
still afflicts philosophy of religion. Can a model be developed to handle 
contemporary religious pluralism? The first methodological requirement, 
as Clayton shows in "Common Ground and Defensible Difference," is to 
recognize cultural and religious diversity as a positive good, a recognition 
already illustrated by kalam in Islamic cultures, by disputation or vada in 
Brahmanical circles in India, and by reports of doctrinal controversies in 
the Buddhist pitakas. In the title essay, "Religions, Reasons, and Gods," 
Clayton's main thesis appears and becomes the anchor for the rest of 
the book. Briefly put, purveyors of proofs were preaching to a choir, not 
pitching apologetics to a critic, hence the relevance of Wittgensteinian phi­
losophy of religion in emphasizing "forms of life." The stimulating effect 
of this chapter, however, derives from the layered use of specific cross­
cultural examples and comparisons that amply illustrate Clayton's thesis 
across Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Western theology.
If theistic arguments were to be studied now in terms of the religious 
forms of life in which they are embedded, how might comparative phi­
losophy of religion proceed? Clayton's approach is developed further in 
Part II. In "Ramanuja, Hume and 'Comparative Philosophy': Remarks on 
the Sribhasya and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," he explores 
a comparison of the different interpretative communities to which Ra­
manuja and Hume belonged, historicizing these as distinct but compa­
rable modes of rationality in terms of their grounds, motives and ends. 
Taking up "Piety and the Proofs" in Chapter 6, Clayton again emphasizes 
the topic of the communities, or forms of life, in which theistic arguments 
operate, here in relation to al-Ghazali and Udayana. The most explicit at­
tention to the question of audience and genre is given in "The Otherness 
of Anselm" where, in an interesting reversal of what many secularists up­
hold, Clayton concludes:
If the religious uses of argument I have been trying to elucidate in
this essay are not uses with which we ourselves can identify, that
may be because we do not identify with the kinds of activities with
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which those uses of arguments were associated. Indeed, if theistic 
arguments no longer make sense to many of us today, this may be 
because we no longer find it possible to participate in the forms of
life in which they were once so firmly embedded___It is not because
they make no sense to us that we no longer participate, but because 
we do not participate, they no longer make sense. (pp. 176-177)
In Part III, alert to the differences between pre-modern and modern con­
texts of theistic arguments, Clayton treats the transition from the former 
to the latter under three regionalized comparative accounts: France and 
the Netherlands; Germany; and Britain. Here is a nuanced and detailed 
history of the rise of atheism in France and the fading of the argument 
from design in Britain. All three chapters in Part III engage intellectual 
debates from the seventeenth century into the nineteenth. The histori­
cal work of these chapters begins with "The Debate about God in Early- 
Modern French Philosophy," taking up Bayle and Mesher; Voltaire and 
Rousseau; Diderot and d'Holbach. It then centers on "The Enlightenment 
Project and the Debate about God in early-modern German Philosophy" 
(chiefly Mendelssohn and Kant) and a fascinating account of "The Debate 
about God in early-modern British philosophy," completed and adapt­
ed by Thomas Carroll. Two strands of theistic argumentation are distin­
guished: a justificatory one and an expressivist one. Although Clayton is 
careful not to press these into a dualism, it is hard not to hear echoes 
of the old cognitive vs. non-cognitive debates of analytic philosophers of 
religion. About the theistic arguments themselves, Clayton finds, in keep­
ing with the anti-foundationalism of our current philosophical climate, 
that "their function is more to serve as tokens of belief than to provide its 
grounds" (p. 299).
This book takes philosophy of religion a welcome distance from such 
unhistoricized notions as religion in general, utopian reason, and the ge­
neric God of theism. Having given up these three interlinked legacies of 
the Enlightenment, what are we left with? A diversity of religions, rea­
sons, and gods, Clayton says, and "no way in advance to say how things 
must go" (p. 305). The kind of significance theistic arguments can still have 
for philosophy, hinted at in Kant, is clarification of the character of divine 
agency within a given religion's understanding of God—or "the scandal 
of manifold particularities," as Clayton calls it (p. 308). In the debate, for 
example, between Naiyayikas and Buddhists in medieval India, and be­
tween Saadya Gaon and Ghazali, different notions of causality figure in 
arguments about a divine cause, and what count as reasons in one context 
do not count in another. Clayton's nuanced and careful contextualizing 
succeeds in showing not only highly specific ways in which cross-cultural 
theistic debates are tradition-constituted in different ways but also how 
they are tradition-constituting in the course of ongoing debates a tradition 
has about itself. Most refreshingly, he points the way to seeing a new form 
of philosophy of religion in which "the clarification of difference, and not 
just the achievement of agreement, is a legitimate end of argument" (p. 
309). An epilogue to the final chapter on "Beyond the 'Enlightenment Proj­
ect'?" delivers a clever twist on Hume's "what havoc must we make?" Well 
worth reading, too, is an Appendix: The 1997 Hulsean Sermon.
